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Introduction 
 In today’s increasingly interdependent global society, international 
institutions formerly committed to operating as insular systems recognizing 
only states as legitimate participants have come under pressure to open their 
processes to public view and participation.  The World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in particular has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and 
democratic participation.1  Nowhere has this criticism been more prevalent 
than in the arena of dispute settlement.2  The controversy over the acceptance 
of amicus briefs at the WTO reflects the tensions among WTO members and 
non-members concerning greater public access to dispute settlement 
                                                 
∗ Associate, O'Melveny & Meyers, New York.  J.D., University of Michigan Law 
School.  The author wishes to thank Professor Rob Howse for helpful comments and 
suggestions. 
 1 Steve Charnovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 299 at 348 
(2002); Robert Howse, Membership and its Privileges:  The WTO, Civil Society, and 
the Amicus Brief Controversy, Outline/Incomplete Draft; John A. Ragosta, 
Unmasking the WTO—Access to the DSB System:  Can the WTO DSB Live up to the 
Moniker “World Trade Court”?, 31 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 739, 756 (2000); Michael 
Laidhold, Private Party Access to the WTO: Do Recent Developments in 
International Trade Dispute Resolution Really Give Private Organizations a Voice in 
the WTO?. 
 2 Id.; See also Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Institutional Concerns of an Expanded 
Trade Regime:  Where Should Global Social and Regulatory Policy be Made?:  
Unfriendly Actions:  The Amicus Brief Battle at the WTO, 7 Wid. L. Symp. J. 87 at 91 
(2001).  
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proceedings.3  This battle has been fought primarily through the Appellate 
Body and its important series of decisions on amicus briefs.4   
 Panels and the Appellate Body govern dispute settlement at the 
WTO.5  Panels are established by the Dispute Settlement Body, which 
consists of all WTO members.  Panels are essentially tribunals, and consist of 
three or sometimes five experts from different countries who render decisions 
in a given trade dispute between member states.  Members of a panel are 
chosen in consultation with the countries that are parties to a dispute (if the 
parties cannot agree, the WTO director-general appoints them).  Panelists 
serve in their individual capacities and cannot receive instructions from any 
government.  A party may appeal the ruling of a panel to the Appellate Body.  
There are seven members of the Appellate Body, and each member serves a 
four-year term.  These individuals are experts in the area of trade law and 
must not be affiliated with any government.  Three members of the Appellate 
Body hear each appeal of a panel ruling. 
 This article argues in favor of increased amicus participation in WTO 
dispute settlement and is divided into four parts.  Part I briefly examines the 
history of Appellate Body decisions concerning amicus briefs.  Part II 
examines the significant new developments in the Sardines case, including the 
acceptance of amicus briefs from governments that are non-parties to a 
dispute.6  Part III explains why amicus practice is desirable at the WTO and 
analyzes some important procedural suggestions for handling the submission 
of amicus briefs.  Part IV proposes and evaluates new possibilities for amicus 
participation in WTO dispute settlement.  These new possibilities include 
participation by government agencies and international organizations, and the 
emergence of a category of briefs relied upon by the panels and Appellate 
Body. 
                                                 
 3 See Donald McRae, Trade and the Environment: Competition, Cooperation or 
Confusion?, 41 Alberta L. Rev. 745; Kim Van der Borght, The Review of the WTO 
Understanding on Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate, 14 
Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1223; Duncan B. Hollis , GLOBALIZATION & THE EROSION 
OF SOVEREIGNTY IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR LICHTENSTEIN: Private Actors 
in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State 
Sovereignty, 25 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 235. 
 4 Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products (“Shrimp-Turtle”), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 12 October 1998; 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines 
(“Sardines”), WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2002. 
 5 See www.wto.org for a complete summary of the dispute settlement system at 
the WTO as described in the introduction of this article.  
 6 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines 
(“Sardines”), WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2002. 
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I.  The Evolution of Appellate Body Decisions on Amicus Briefs. 
 The Appellate Body rendered its first important decision on amicus 
briefs in the Shrimp-Turtle case7.  In Shrimp-Turtle the governments of India, 
Pakistan, Thailand and Malaysia protested a United States embargo on shrimp 
harvested by a method that harmed sea turtles.  The United States attached 
three non-governmental organization (NGO) briefs to its appellant’s 
submission.  The Appellate Body admitted these three amicus briefs as part of 
the U.S. submission.8  More importantly, the Appellate Body overruled the 
panel’s finding that it did not have authority to accept unattached amicus 
briefs.  The Appellate Body criticized as too narrow and technical the panel’s 
interpretation of the grant in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) of a right to seek information.9  
Instead the Appellate Body declared that the “authority to seek information is 
not properly equated with a prohibition on accepting information which has 
been submitted without having been requested by a panel.”10  Therefore 
panels do have a right under Articles 11, 12 and 13 of the DSU to accept 
amicus briefs, whether or not attached to a member’s submission.11   
 The next important Appellate Body ruling addressing amicus briefs 
made clear that the Appellate Body itself could also consider unsolicited 
amicus briefs.12  In Carbon Steel the Appellate Body found power to consider 
amicus briefs in Article 17.9 of the DSU and its grant of broad authority to 
adopt procedural rules, provided that such rules do not conflict with the DSU 
or any covered agreements.13  The Appellate Body explained the nature and 
limitations of its power: “Individuals and organizations, which are not 
Members of the WTO, have no legal right to make submissions to or to be 
heard by the Appellate Body.  The Appellate Body has no legal duty to accept 
or consider unsolicited amicus curiae briefs submitted by individuals or 
organizations, not Members of the WTO.”14  In this manner the Appellate 
Body emphasized the discretionary character of amicus participation. 
                                                 
 7 Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products (“Shrimp-Turtle”), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 12 October 1998. 
 8 Id. at ¶89. 
 9 Art. 13. 
 10 Shrimp-Turtle at ¶108. 
 11 For a critique of this decision and its method of interpretation, See Josh 
Robbins, False Friends: Amicus Curiae and Procedural Discretion in WTO Appeals 
under the Hot-Rolled Lead/Asbestos Doctrine, 44 Harv. Int’l L.J. 317 (2003). 
 12 Appellate Body Report, United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the 
United Kingdom (“Carbon Steel”), WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 10 May 2000. 
 13 Id. at ¶39. 
 14 Id. at ¶9. 
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 The more recent Asbestos case brought new procedural developments 
to amicus participation.15  Faced with a number of amicus submissions, and 
cognizant of the health and public interest issues inherent in the case, the 
Appellate Body adopted, pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures 
for Appellate Review, for purposes of the Asbestos appeal only, an additional 
procedure to deal with amicus submissions.16  The Appellate Body then 
denied all applications for leave to file a written brief, claiming that each 
applicant failed to comply sufficiently with the requirements set forth in 
paragraph 3 of the Additional Procedure.17 
 The actions of the Appellate Body caused a great deal of 
consternation among both WTO members and those who had requested leave 
to file an amicus brief. Applicants denied by the Appellate Body felt insulted 
by the statement that none among them had correctly followed a set of simple 
procedures.18  Several WTO members felt a similar sense of disgust after the 
Asbestos decision, although for entirely different reasons--they disdained the 
notion of amicus practice under any circumstances.19  Member governments 
objected to amicus participation with more hostility than ever before, and 
Egypt called a meeting of the WTO General Council to address the situation.  
At that meeting, twenty-four governments criticized the Appellate Body, four 
did not criticize the Appellate Body, and only one (the United States) 
endorsed the Appellate Body’s action.20  This widespread discontent with the 
Appellate Body’s amicus jurisprudence led some to believe that the Appellate 
Body was retreating from its policy of accepting amicus briefs.  However, 
such notions were proven wrong by another Appellate Body ruling expanding 
amicus participation in dispute settlement.   
II.  Expansion of Amicus Practice:  Benefits and Dangers of The Sardines 
Decision.  
                                                 
 15 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos Containing Products (“Asbestos”), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 12 
March 2001. 
 16 Id. at ¶52. 
 17 Id. at ¶56. 
 18 See Howse, supra note 1 at 15. 
 19 See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting, WTO Doc. 
WT/DSB/M/83 (June 7, 2000).  See also Decision by the Appellate Body Concerning 
Amicus Briefs, Statement by Uruguay at the General Council, WTO Doc. WT/GC/38, 
at 3 (Nov. 22, 2000). 
 20  Steve Charnovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 299 at 348 
(2002). 
 (Citing WTO General Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William 
Rappard on 22 November 2000, WT/GC/M/60, para. 1 (Jan. 23, 2001). 
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 Part II of this article (a) explains the Sardines decision; (b) analyzes 
the benefits of the Sardines decision; and (c) analyzes problems that might 
result from expansion of amicus practice under Sardines. 
a.  Sardines developments 
 Recent developments in amicus practice include the Appellate Body’s 
decision to accept amicus briefs from governments that have not exercised 
their third party rights.21  This development signals an increasingly liberalized 
approach to amicus participation in WTO dispute settlement.   
The Sardines case involved the submission by WTO member 
Morocco of an amicus brief in a dispute between Peru and the European 
Communities.  Peru’s letter dated 26 July 2002 contended that accepting such 
a brief would allow a WTO member to “impermissibly circumvent the DSU” 
which “establishes the conditions under which WTO members can participate 
as third parties in dispute settlement proceedings.”22  Peru hinged its argument 
on Articles 10.2 and 17.4 of the DSU, which govern participation and written 
submissions by third parties.23  The Appellate Body responded by reasserting 
its discretion to accept amicus briefs and broadening that discretion to include 
the acceptance of amicus briefs by WTO members.24  The Appellate Body 
reasoned that the existence of an explicit right of WTO members to 
participate as third parties in dispute settlement proceedings did not justify 
treating members differently from non-members regarding amicus 
submissions.25  Addressing the concern that it should not treat non-members 
more favorably than members with regard to amicus participation, the 
Appellate Body noted:  “As we have already determined that we have the 
authority to receive an amicus curiae brief from a private individual or an 
organization, a fortiori we are entitled to accept such a brief from a WTO 
Member, provided there is no prohibition on doing so in the DSU.  We find 
no such prohibition.”26 
 The Appellate Body continued its sensible approach, articulated 
previously in US-Lead and Bismuth II, of not permitting broad negative 
inferences to be drawn from narrowly constructed DSU rules.27  Clearly just 
because the Appellate Body has the legal duty to accept submissions from 
                                                 
 21 Sardines, supra note 1. 
 22 Id.at ¶154.    
 23 Id. at. ¶ 161. 
 24 Id. at. ¶157; ¶164. 
 25 Id. at ¶163. 
 26 Id. at ¶164. 
 27 US Lead and Bismuth II, WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 7 June 2000. 
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parties and third parties does not thereby mean that it does not possess the 
legal discretion to accept amicus curiae submissions from WTO members.28 
 The Appellate Body thus determined that acceptance of amicus curiae 
briefs filed by members is a matter of discretion, to be determined on a case-
by-case basis.29  The Appellate Body reaffirmed its finding in Carbon Steel 
that Article 17.9 of the DSU provides broad legal authority for the Appellate 
Body to regulate its own procedures.30  It seems appropriate for the Appellate 
Body to consider the underlying purposes of WTO law and dispute settlement 
in making decisions of this manner.  If the Appellate Body finds any amicus 
brief objectionable or simply not useful in deciding the dispute, it can choose 
not to consider that brief.  This discretion will create a balance of interests by 
allowing access for amicus submissions while at the same time appropriately 
limiting the influence of such submissions. 
b.  Benefits of the Sardines decision 
 One benefit of this new development in amicus participation is that it 
will allow WTO members to access the Appellate Body in disputes which 
may have an impact on them which was not foreseen at the time appropriate 
for intervention as a third party.  Allowing access at this later time will ensure 
that all members with an interest in the dispute have the opportunity to present 
their views, subject always to the discretion of the Appellate Body.  If the 
Appellate Body determines that a member submitting an amicus curiae brief 
has an interest that is merely ancillary to the dispute, or not legally cognizable 
for whatever reason, it can choose to ignore the submission. 
 It is also important to note that the significance of Appellate Body 
decisions extends beyond the impact nations realize economically through 
implementation of particular rulings.  Perhaps equally important is the role the 
Appellate Body’s decisions play in clarifying the law.31  One scholar has 
noted: “complete party control over the scope of appellate legal interpretation 
may not serve the interests of clarification of the law.  One response has been 
for the AB to take a very broad view of who may be a party or third party to a 
proceeding (see Bananas).”32  The Appellate Body has now further 
supplemented this broad view by allowing members to access a dispute to 
which they have not become a third party.  Thus the Appellate Body may 
exercise discretion to address a new category of legal arguments that may not 
                                                 
 28 For an opposing view, see Robbins, supra note 9. 
 29 Sardines, supra note 1 at ¶167. 
 30 Sardines at ¶ 166. 
 31 DSU 3.2. 
 32 Robert Howse, Membership and its Privileges:  The WTO, Civil Society, and 
the Amicus Brief Controversy, Outline/Incomplete Draft.   
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otherwise have been addressed in arguments by the parties, third parties, or 
other amicus participants.  In this respect the Appellate Body’s acceptance of 
WTO member amicus briefs is consistent with its role under DSU 3.2 
c.  Potential problems with expansion of amicus practice under Sardines 
 One objection to this new development in amicus participation 
suggests that allowing greater access for WTO members in this fashion will 
facilitate ambush style tactics, with substantively significant legal arguments 
strategically held until late in the proceeding.  This problem may be 
adequately addressed by adopting a set of formal procedures for amicus 
participation.  One interesting model is the recent proposal of the European 
Communities for a new Article to be inserted into the DSU after Article 13.33 
This proposal suggests that any person wishing to make an amicus submission 
must apply for leave to file within 15 days from the date of the composition of 
the panel or within five days from the date of the notice of appeal.34  
Additionally the Communication provides that parties and third parties to the 
dispute be given ten days from the date of receipt of any amicus curiae 
submission to comment on that submission.  This ten-day period would 
protect the parties and third parties from ambush style tactics.  However, 
while the 15-day and five-day limits will also serve this function, they seem 
too brief for a prospective amicus participant to apply for leave to file a 
submission.  The interests of the parties and third parties can be protected, and 
due process respected, while maintaining a longer window of opportunity for 
amicus to decide whether to participate.    
 Another complaint related to protecting the parties and third parties to 
a dispute suggests that amicus participation of any sort tends to favor 
developed countries.35  This argument insists that NGOs tend to be located in 
wealthier countries and therefore will be sympathetic to the views of those 
nations.  While this notion is far from a proven point, it is worth examining 
the effect participation as amicus by WTO members might have on this 
debate.36  Will this new member amicus participation alleviate that perceived 
problem; or is it an unfair burden on developing countries?  
                                                 
 33 Contribution of the European Communities and its Member States to the 
Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:  Communication from 
the European Communities, TN/DS/W/1, 13 March 2002. 
 34 Id. at ¶2. 
 35 See McRae, supra note 3. 
 36 See John A. Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO—Access to the DSB System:  Can 
the WTO DSB Live up to the Moniker “World Trade Court?”, 31 LAW & POL’Y INT’L 
BUS. 739, 756 (2000).  
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 Developing countries may view member amicus participation as 
another weapon that developed countries may use to impose undue costs on 
and tax the minimal resources of lesser developed countries (LDCs).  On the 
other hand, LDCs may in some cases not see opportunities to intervene as 
third parties as a result of their lack of resources.  When this occurs, opening 
the door for participation at a later date as amicus may be an advantage to 
LDCs.  In any case, participation by members as amicus should lead to better 
information, both factually and legally, for use by panels or the Appellate 
Body in deciding disputes.     
 Another angle ties amicus participation to questions and concerns 
about lobbying.  Viewed positively, member amicus participation generally 
allows those members without political connections or lobbying money 
greater access to the dispute settlement process.  This fairness argument 
makes sense, but can be countered by another view that suggests that 
expanding amicus participation could lead to more burdensome lobbying by 
private organizations.  For example, a private organization might feel the 
panel or Appellate Body would take its arguments more seriously if they 
appeared in a brief submitted by a WTO member.37  This type of lobbying 
could lead to an unfair advantage gained by those with powerful lobbying 
efforts, such as large corporations with an economic interest in a dispute.  In 
turn this advantage could act to skew the legal inquiry substantively away 
from broader policy concerns and towards the specific economic interests at 
stake.    
III.  The Case for Amicus Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement. 
 Before moving on to discuss possible future developments in amicus 
participation, it is important to make the case for the benefits of amicus 
participation as it currently exists.  Part III of this article addresses the pro-
amicus arguments most frequently mentioned by scholars, including (a) the 
need to address the democracy deficit at the WTO (meaningfulness of access 
for groups or individuals whose rights and interests are at stake) and (b) the 
concern over transparency.38  Section (c) of Part III addresses procedural 
mechanisms for handling amicus submissions and analyzes objections to 
                                                 
 37 See Michael Laidhold, Private Party Access to the WTO: Do Recent 
Developments in International Trade Dispute Resolution Really Give Private 
Organizations a Voice in the WTO?, 12 Transnational Law 427, 443 (1999).  
Laidhold discusses the negative effects of private parties lobbying WTO members to 
join in disputes as a third party.   
 38 See Maura Blue Jeffords , TURNING THE PROTESTER INTO A PARTNER 
FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE CONSULTATION 
BETWEEN THE WTO & NGOs, 28 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 937; David J. Bederman, 
National Security: Globalization, International Law and United States Foreign 
Policy, 50 Emory L.J. 717 (2001). 
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amicus participation, including concerns over confidentiality, due process and 
fairness to lesser developed countries.39 
a.  Democracy Deficit 
 Many scholars have identified a so-called democracy deficit at the 
WTO.40  This notion complains that the WTO fails to give dispute settlement 
access to those parties whose interests are often at stake in a dispute.  As only 
states have standing, NGOs, corporations, other private groups and 
individuals have no recognized method for influencing decisions that impact 
them.41  This denial of participation has been termed a democracy deficit and 
is often cited as a problem that can be alleviated in part through amicus 
participation.42 
 WTO members have often objected to amicus participation on the 
grounds that it is inappropriate to a system designed to give rights only to 
state members.43  This criticism ignores the practical reality of the dispute 
settlement process:  “There can be little doubt that non-state actors have long 
played very significant—albeit informal and unofficial—roles in both the 
legislative and dispute resolution processes.”44  The Kodak-Fuji dispute and 
the Reformulated Gas dispute are examples of disputes that are only 
nominally between WTO parties, and “can be more fruitfully understood as 
components of complex international corporate battles.”45  Therefore the 
WTO dispute settlement system can be understood as formally granting rights 
                                                 
 39 Maki Tanaka, Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Souther 
Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute 
Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles, 30 Ecology L.Q. 113 (2003). 
 40 Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governannce and the WTO, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 
303 (2004). 
 41 Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: The 
WTO, NAFTA, and International Harmonization of Standards, 50 Kan. L. Rev. 823 
(2002). 
 42 Michael Laidhold, Private Party Access to the WTO: Do Recent Developments 
in International Trade Dispute Resolution Really Give Private Organizations a Voice 
in the WTO? 12 Transnat’l Law 427 (1999). 
 43 See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting, WTO Doc. 
WT/DSB/M/83 (June 7, 2000). See also Decision by the Appellate Body Concerning 
Amicus Briefs, Statement by Uruguay at the General Council, WTO Doc. WT/GC/38, 
at 3 (Nov. 22, 2000). 
 44 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, International Law Weekend Proceedings:  Civil Society at 
the WTO: The Illusion of Inclusion?, 7 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 275 at 281 (2001). 
 45 Id. at 282. 
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only to states, while informally recognizing the interests of large and powerful 
corporations.46 
 By contrast, NGOs often face a more difficult battle in getting their 
views before the panels or Appellate Body.  The opponents of amicus 
participation would have the interests of NGOs channeled exclusively through 
governments.  But NGOs need independent participatory access because 
governments cannot always represent their interests.  The goals of the NGO or 
other private organization may directly conflict with the government’s 
position, or may contain some legal arguments and policy concerns not 
adopted by the government.  For example, the interests of a consumer group 
NGO would not be likely to coincide with the government’s interest in a case 
challenging a protectionist measure of that government.47  NGO access is 
even more important for NGOs from developing countries that may not have 
the resources to participate effectively in WTO dispute settlement.48  
Additionally, the situation could be even bleaker for NGOs located in nations 
not yet admitted as WTO members.49  These NGOs would find access to 
WTO dispute settlement obstructed by the status of their home nation.   
 WTO dispute settlement may also be enhanced by the participation of 
individuals.  WTO legal provisions contain reference to the GATT/WTO 
purpose of protecting the interests of individuals.50  The panel in the S. 301 
case considered these individual interests relevant to the interpretation of 
treaty provisions:  
However, it would be completely wrong to consider that the 
position of individuals is of no relevance to the GATT/WTO 
matrix.  Many of the benefits to Members which are meant to 
flow as a result of the acceptance of various disciplines under 
the GATT/WTO depend on the activity of individual 
economic operators in the national and global market places.  
The purpose of many of these disciplines, indeed one of the 
primary objects of the GATT/WTO as a whole, is to produce 
                                                 
 46  Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate Over NGO Participation at the 
WTO, 1 J. of Int’l Econ. L. 433 (1998). 
 47 Charnovitz, supra note 9 at 324. 
 48  Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, 24 
Fordham Int’l L.J. 173, 205-206 (2000). 
 49 Id. 
 50 See the Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
which contains references to “raising standards of living, ensuring full employment 
and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand.” 
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certain market conditions which would allow this individual 
activity to flourish.51  
 The panel sets forth a teleological interpretation of both the Preamble 
to the WTO Agreement and Article 3.2 of the DSU.52  The panel interprets 
DSU Art. 3.2 as containing a purpose to protect individual economic actors:  
“The security and predictability in question are of “the multilateral trading 
system.”  The multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of 
States, but also, indeed mostly, of individual economic operators.  The lack of 
security and predictability affects mostly these individual operators.”53  
Recognizing the salient reality of the individual interests at stake, the panel 
notes that the complaints of individual economic actors often trigger dispute 
settlement proceedings, thereby producing what the panel refers to as 
“indirect effect”.54  Put another way, violation of a member state’s rights often 
flows directly from the injury to individual economic actors within that state.  
By bringing suit to enforce its rights a member state provides an indirect route 
for individual economic actors to remedy their injuries.     
 The panel employs a method of interpretation whereby panels and the 
Appelate Body may recognize the significance of individual interests without 
compromising the fundamental nature of the WTO as a system granting rights 
only to state members.55 
 Amicus practice is another means of providing indirect access to 
individual interests, the protection of which is already well understood as 
fundamental to the achievement of the underlying purposes and goals of the 
WTO.56  Allowing these individuals to influence their fate through amicus 
participation would help alleviate democracy deficit.   
 The Hormones dispute between the United States and the European 
Communities is a classic example of a case directly affecting individuals.57   
European consumers of beef, in their individual capacity, will be affected by a 
decision calling for a removal of the trade barrier against hormone treated 
beef (if the removal is ever actually effectuated).  One could argue that the 
consumer may choose to boycott any hormone treated beef, but in reality this 
                                                 
 51 Report of the Panel, United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 
(“S. 301”), WT/DS152/R at ¶7.73, 22 December 1999. 
 52 Id. at ¶7.74-7.75. 
 53 Id. at ¶7.76, (quoting DSU art. 3.2). 
 54 Id. at ¶7.77-7.78. 
 55 See Howse, supra note 16. 
 56 See S. 301, supra note 28. 
 57 Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998.  
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may prove extremely difficult and burdensome.  Imagine as a matter of 
necessity inquiring each time a person enters a supermarket, butcher shop, or 
perhaps more problematic, a restaurant, and demanding to know the source 
and character of all beef being sold.  A general boycott at the wholesaler level 
would be inconsistent with the goals of a decision condemning the ban and 
might raise antitrust issues. 
 Furthermore, some individuals may be powerless to protect 
themselves from the effects of a WTO ruling in a case such as Hormones.  For 
example, children are known to be particularly susceptible to the effects of 
food borne illnesses.  Although unrelated to hormone treated beef, the E-coli 
problem experienced in the United States demonstrates this phenomenon.  
Who will represent the interests of children if their parents fail to recognize a 
danger?  In this scenario the activities of NGOs might interact with the 
interests of a class of individuals who would otherwise be powerless to 
represent themselves.  It seems sensible to allow NGOs to participate as 
amicus, rather than leaving such public interest issues solely to the discretion 
of the governments involved in a dispute.  As has been noted by many 
scholars, one common and prominent critique of the WTO system complains 
of too much reliance on governments and economic theory to protect the 
public interest.58  Such a problematic imbalance is particularly troublesome 
when health issues are at stake. 
 This imbalance also reaches the tension between environmental and 
economic interests. The failure of states to adequately balance these 
competing concerns makes amicus participation particularly desirable.  One 
WTO critic has noted that “critics argue that trade panels, by their very 
designation, place trade values above other more important social issues…an 
international body will have supremacy without the broader world view in 
mind.”59  In this view, the potentially narrow focus of a panel is an 
institutional failure that can be remedied in part by allowing outside experts 
with divergent opinions access to the process.   
 More liberal amicus participation will better serve the public interest 
for disputes involving especially novel or complex industries.  An intellectual 
property dispute might involve complicated issues that NGOs are particularly 
well suited to explicate.  For example, “Sierra Club or the ASCAP spend 
more time and money researching their particular area of interest than does 
                                                 
 58 See Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy:  No Love at First 
Sight, 95 A.J.I.L. 489 (2001). 
 59 Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Institutional Concerns of an Expanded Trade 
Regime:  Where Should Global Social and Regulatory Policy be Made?:  Unfriendly 
Actions:  The Amicus Brief Battle at the WTO, 7 Wid. L. Symp. J. 87 at 91 (2001). 
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the U.S. government.”60  The same could be said for NGOs with any number 
of special areas of environmental expertise.  While these NGO’s undoubtedly 
may introduce their own prejudices into their arguments, the panels and 
Appellate Body are sophisticated enough to filter this information for its core 
usefulness.  In these especially difficult cases, more complete information 
through amicus participation can lead to better dispute settlement and will 
enhance the efficiency of the WTO.61 
b.  Transparency 
 Another major critique of the WTO focuses on the lack of 
transparency to the dispute settlement process.62  Transparency in 
international law as a concept can be traced as far back as the philosopher 
Kant’s essay “Perpetual Peace.”63  Kant writes: “all actions that affect the 
rights of other men are wrong if their maxim is not consistent with 
publicity.”64  Kant’s writing reflects the high value placed on maintaining 
openness in judicial processes that affect the public interest.  His idea implies 
that men will recognize unfairness or abuse of process if that process is held 
open to scrutiny.  It seems natural to insist that transparency improve at the 
WTO in order to avoid any such systemic risk of unfairness and to stimulate 
better policy discussions amongst both members and non-members.  One 
could argue that those outside the WTO system have an inherent right to 
compete, with full information, in the marketplace of ideas to influence 
decisions that will inevitably impact them.  At the very least, the improvement 
of transparency will reduce suspicion of and increase public confidence in the 
WTO system. 
 Comparing the WTO system to the American dispute resolution 
system sheds light on why the WTO system’s lack of transparency is 
particularly problematic.  United States courts fit into a constitutional scheme 
that includes “transparent procedures for staffing them, an active practice of 
dissent, extensive openness to amicus curiae, and the means to overrule 
judicial decisions that do not depend, as in the WTO, on achieving political 
consensus.”65  The extraordinary power of the Appellate Body is not subject 
                                                 
 60 Id. at 102. 
 61 See Jacqueline Peel, Giving the Public a Voice in the Protection of the Global 
Environment:  Avenues for Participation by NGO’s in Dispute Resolution at the 
European Court of Justice and World Trade Organization, 12 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. 
& Pol’y 47 (2001). 
 62 See Bederman, supra note 37. 
 63 See Charnovitz, supra note 9. 
 64 Id. at 301, (quoting Kant). 
 65 Kal Raustiala, AEI Conference Trends in Global Governance: Do They 
Threaten American Sovereignty?  Article and Response:  Sovereignty and 
Multilateralism, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 401 at 413 (2000). 
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to the same checks and balances as the courts of the United States.  Nor is the 
Appellate Body under the microscope of public opinion in the same way as 
the Supreme Court of the United States.  Decisions of the Appellate Body, at 
least in theory, are not subject to the same political or public oversights, and 
its inaccessibility seems consequently even more dangerous. 
 One method for addressing the transparency problem at the WTO 
would call for greater participation of amicus in WTO dispute settlement.  
Amicus participation is consistent with the ideas of Kant, who points out that 
governments should consult philosophers in matters of international relations, 
and that philosophers have a moral obligation to participate where it is not 
expressly forbidden.66  In the modern context, the NGOs or other amicus 
participants may be characterized as the philosophers, who will and should 
participate where not forbidden.67  Unlike member states of the WTO, NGOs 
tend to publicize their legal theories and views regarding disputes with which 
they are involved.  Consequently, engaging NGOs in the WTO dispute 
settlement process will often create the publicity esteemed by Kant and sought 
by WTO critics.  If an amicus brief, filed by an NGO in a WTO proceeding, is 
posted by that NGO on its website and circulated among academics and other 
interested NGOs, transparency will be increased with respect to the legal 
issues and facts addressed in the brief.  
  Consider also the reciprocal relationship between greater transparency 
and amicus participation.  Just as participation of amicus would help engender 
greater transparency, greater transparency of process (such as opening dispute 
hearings to the public) would create more meaningful access for amicus.  
Analogizing to Kant’s model, participation by philosophers will be facilitated 
by an opening of the process to public view.  This in turn will reduce public 
concerns about the integrity of the process.  
c.  Objections to Amicus Participation and Proposed Procedural 
Mechanisms Addressing these Objections. 
 While participation of amicus in WTO dispute settlement will help 
with the problems of democracy deficit and transparency, many critics have 
noted that due process, confidentiality and fairness to LDCs are legitimate 
concerns of amicus participation.68  The best method for addressing these 
concerns is to create a set of procedures for amicus participation designed to 
protect the interests of the parties and third parties to the dispute. 
                                                 
 66 Charnovitz, supra note 9 at 303. 
67 That is, they should participate in the WTO dispute settlement process where 
no express provision exists denying access for prospective amicus participants 
 68 See Tanaka, supra note 38. 
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 As discussed earlier in connection with the Sardines case, the 
European Communities (EC) suggested a set of procedures to be inserted after 
Article 13 of the DSU.69  The first paragraph of the EC Communication 
provides that unsolicited amicus submissions must be directly relevant to the 
factual and legal issues under consideration by the panel or Appellate Body.70  
In addition, paragraph 3(d) requires the amicus applicant to demonstrate the 
direct interest that the applicant has in the dispute and paragraph 3(f) requires 
the applicant also to show why it would be desirable for the panel or 
Appellate Body to grant the applicant leave to file a submission.71  These 
provisions serve a gate keeping purpose and prevent the feared deluge of 
amicus submissions from affecting the parties to a dispute.  This will be 
particularly relevant to LDCs that may not have resources to address a 
multitude of amicus submissions.   
 A more progressive approach to developing amicus practice might 
also include a list of criteria especially relevant to the values and goals of 
amicus participation.  For example criteria might be found in “the broader 
objectives of the WTO as expressed in the preamble to the WTO Agreement, 
including the reference to sustainable development, and the requirement for 
positive measures to ensure that developing countries secure a commensurate 
share in the growth of international trade.”72  These criteria should be 
incorporated into the procedures for amicus participation.  Procedures could 
endorse these considerations as being of primary importance in amicus 
participation, while specifically not closing the door on participation by 
amicus curiae representing corporate interests.  Adoption of such value 
preferences into procedural rules would encourage participation by NGOs 
with a public interest motive.     
 The EC Communication further addresses these types of concerns by 
requiring an application for leave to file an amicus brief to contain a 
“description of the applicant, including a statement of the membership and 
legal status of the applicant, the general objectives pursued by the applicant, 
the nature of the activities of the applicant, and the sources of financing of the 
applicant.”73  The panel or Appellate Body in a dispute can use these criteria 
to screen applicants and deny the applications of those deemed inappropriate.  
Prospective amicus participants that are funded indirectly by a party or third 
party, or by powerful corporations, whose interests are known to coincide 
                                                 
 69 Communication from the European Communities, supra note 17. 
 70 Id. at ¶1. 
 71 Id. at ¶3. 
 72 Gabriele Marceau & Matthew Stillwell, Practical Suggestions for “Amicus 
Curiae” Briefs Before WTO Adjudicating Bodies, 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 155 at 179 
(2001). 
 73 Communication from the European Communities, supra note 17 at ¶3(c). 
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with a party, will at least be compelled to disclose the true nature of their 
interest in the dispute.   
 One could make the argument that NGOs from developed countries 
tend to represent a national or regional interest whether or not they receive 
any funding or support from their governments.  These NGOs are better 
funded due to their location in a particular wealthy area, and thus their 
participation may create a bias in favor of their home region.  While biases 
may be created, the EC procedures would allow the Appellate Body or panels 
the discretion, under a standard of full information and disclosure, to 
determine whether or not amicus participation would create unfairness in 
particular situations.  This should control the potential abuse of the amicus 
process by wealthier parties on a case-by-case basis, and provide for greater 
likelihood of success for amicus participants that are purely public interest 
NGOs.     
 Even in the absence of procedural mechanisms for controlling amicus 
participation, the objection to amicus practice as favoring corporate interests 
or tipping the balance of power unfairly in any particular direction can be met 
with the answer that it is up to the members of a panel or Appellate Body to 
monitor this potential unfairness.  As Professor Mavroidis points out: “And 
yes, many friends of the court are rather friends of themselves.  They do not 
care about systemic issues, they do not care for the truth.  They want to sell a 
message.  But this is not an argument against accepting amicus curiae briefs.  
This is an argument in favour of selecting properly the members of a court.”74  
Put another way, the character and motivation of the amicus participants will 
be less important than the judicial caution exercised by panel or Appellate 
Body members in attaching weight to particular amicus briefs.  Therefore 
concerns over the effects of amicus practice lend weight to other proposals for 
reform of the WTO dispute settlement process, including the call for 
developing a permanent panel.75  Additionally, Mavroidis points out that 
Article 13 of the DSU provides the mandate for panels to seek out whatever 
information they may deem necessary to resolving the dispute, regardless of 
whether such information has been pleaded by a party.76   
                                                 
 74 Petros C. Mavroidis, Amicus Curiae Briefs Before the WTO:  Much Ado About 
Nothing, Jean Monnet Working Paper at 12 (Feb. 2001), at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010201.html.  
 75 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Improvements of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System, Conference Report.  Petersmann’s Report summarizes the main arguments 
made in the discussions of eight papers presented at the conference on Improvements 
and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the World Trade 
Organization-WTO Negotiators Meet Academics, at European University Institute in 
Florence from 13-14 September 2002.  
 76 Mavroidis, supra note 39. 
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 Looking at the concerns about prejudice to LDCs from a more 
pragmatic perspective, the idea that amicus practice benefits the wealthier 
nations is even more dubious.  Notably, these powerful players “have access 
to politicians, and therefore to the servants of politicians, delegates and 
ambassadors; they have access as well, or the resources to buy access, to 
lawyers, consultants and lobbyists who can make their views effectively 
known in the Geneva community.”77  With this arsenal of tactics at their 
disposal, why would the most powerful WTO members even bother with 
amicus submissions?  Because amicus briefs are one of the most effective 
methods of participation only for members who do not possess the resources 
mentioned above, and therefore do not enjoy the benefits of lobbying or 
employing teams of sophisticated attorneys.  In any case, the EC procedures 
would help break down what little remains of the objection to amicus 
participation on grounds of its prejudice to LDCs. 
 As noted earlier, some of the time constraints proposed by the EC 
seem too short.  These include Paragraph 5, which provides that an applicant 
granted leave to file a submission must make its submission to the panel 
within 15 days from the date of receipt of notification and to the Appellate 
Body within 3 days of such date.78  The three-day window for submissions to 
the Appellate Body seems too short a time for an amicus participant to file a 
brief.  In order to meet such a deadline an amicus participant would probably 
need to have the brief worked out prior to receipt of permission to file.  
Expanding the time period to file would not be detrimental to the parties.   
 The EC Communication might also benefit from a provision 
concerning confidentiality.  It is not clear exactly why confidentiality would 
be a major concern in amicus practice, but a provision detailing the 
obligations of amicus participants would help abate criticism.  A procedure 
could be developed whereby any amicus participant would be required to sign 
a letter indicating that certain specified categories of private information it 
learns through its participation in the dispute would remain confidential.  
Penalties for violating the provisions could include denial of any future 
opportunity to apply for leave to file as amicus.     
 Additionally, the notice requirement contained in paragraph 7 of the 
EC Communication could be more detailed.79  A new procedure could be 
adopted specifically requiring service on all parties and third parties, and 
requiring such service to contain the disclosure information mandated in 
paragraph 3.80  Beyond that new procedures could require any amicus 
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 78 Communication from the European Communities, supra note XYZ at ¶5. 
 79 Id. at ¶7. 
 80 Id. at ¶3. 
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submissions to be made available to all WTO members upon request, as done 
under Article 18 of the DSU with non-confidential summaries of parties’ 
submissions to WTO dispute settlement.81  Translations might also be 
provided to parties in appropriate circumstances.82   
IV.  The Future of Amicus Practice at the WTO:  Government Agencies, 
International Organizations, and Briefs Relied Upon 
 After the Sardines decision, the question arises as to how far the 
WTO’s expanding amicus practice will extend.  Now that the Appellate Body 
has reasserted its discretion to accept amicus briefs and expanded amicus 
participation to include acceptance of briefs by WTO members, it is not 
difficult to envision a variety of other possibilities.  Part IV of this article will 
examine (a) the possibility of acceptance of amicus briefs from government 
organs; (b) acceptance of amicus briefs from international organizations; and 
(c) the emergence of a new category of briefs “relied on” by the adjudicating 
body.  
a.  Government Agencies 
 If WTO member states may submit amicus briefs, perhaps organs of 
those governments should be allowed to submit amicus briefs as well.  To 
examine this question it may be useful to return to the discussion earlier 
regarding the special desirability of amicus briefs in disputes with significant 
public health components.  For example the Hormones dispute, or imagine 
instead a dispute involving a protectionist measure employed by the European 
Union to prevent the shipment of American beef tainted by E-coli.  A 
Canadian government agency might wish to file an amicus brief in such a 
hypothetical dispute between the United States and the European Union.  
Suppose that the Canadian government agency that is equivalent to the USDA 
knew of severely unsafe conditions in American meatpacking plants.  These 
conditions might include unsafe line speeds and other unsanitary slaughtering 
conditions leading inevitably to fecal contamination in the meat.  Through its 
expertise with monitoring its own similar industry, the Canadian agency 
might be able to provide useful expert information regarding industry practice 
and minimal safety standards necessary to prevent outbreaks of food 
poisoning.   
 A filing by this agency independent of its government might be 
necessary in order to get its views before the panel or Appellate Body.  The 
                                                 
 81 Gabriele Marceau & Matthew Stillwell, Practical Suggestions for “Amicus 
Curiae” Briefs Before WTO Adjudicating Bodies, 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 155 at 182-183 
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Canadian government might choose for political reasons to not endorse the 
views of this agency.  If that were the case, the agency, if led by independent 
minded individuals, and if permissible under Canadian law, could go forward 
with its filing as amicus curiae.  This would be desirable in order to have the 
fullest and best information available to a panel or Appellate Body, especially 
in a dispute involving an industry the Canadian government agency is perhaps 
uniquely qualified to comment on. 
 Other, more grisly scenarios are imaginable which a different 
Canadian government agency might be qualified to analyze.  Continuing with 
our hypothetical case, a Canadian government agency responsible for 
workplace safety standards might have useful information to share with a 
panel or Appellate Body.  Suppose this government agency knows that certain 
practices, employed by United States slaughterhouses, are inherently unsafe 
for workers.  Statistics maintained by this agency regarding the correlation 
between line speeds at slaughterhouses and worker injury rates might be 
useful to a panel.  These statistics might show an alarming rate of serious 
injury resulting in deep flesh wounds to workers, from which human blood 
may contaminate the meat supply.  Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle tells a truth-
based tale wherein a slaughterhouse worker falls into a vat of burning animal 
fat and is incinerated.83  The worker’s flesh is then incorporated into sausage.  
While this is an extreme example, it illustrates a relevant point about the 
relationship between workplace safety in slaughterhouses and meat 
contamination.  Any such information held by a Canadian government agency 
would be scientifically relevant to the same industry practices in the United 
States and would involve directly the serious public interest issues in the case. 
 Other types of government agencies might also become involved in 
filing amicus briefs with the WTO.  This could occur in any situation where 
the government agency wished to express a view not joined in or endorsed by 
the executive branch of its government.  Legislative committees could enter 
the debate in this manner, subject of course to the internal jurisdictional laws 
of their nations.  The United States Senate Finance Committee is one potential 
candidate for amicus participation.  The expertise of a committee and its 
workforce of attorneys and advisors could prove helpful to panels or the 
Appellate Body.  There is also a plausible argument that a legislative 
committee would express views more accountable to public opinion than 
those of the executive branch.  The U.S. Trade Representative, for example, 
has been accused of being used as a tool for corporate interests.84  Although 
all elected officials have ties to corporate interests and campaign contributors, 
involving another branch of government would expand the field of interests 
represented and might include ideas not otherwise presented.   
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b.  International Organizations 
 The participation of international organizations presents another 
interesting possibility for amicus practice.  A committee of the United Nations 
might play a useful role in dispute settlement as amicus curiae.   The 
multinational character of a U.N. committee would make its participation 
uniquely desirable.  Arguably a group of individuals composing a committee 
should not represent their individual governments or corporate interests.  
Instead they could act as independent legal experts with no cognizable interest 
in the case.  For example, U.N. legal experts could file an amicus brief in a 
case involving principles of treaty interpretation.  This could have the 
beneficial effect of broadening the scope of legal principles and interpretative 
methods relied upon by panels and the Appellate Body.  International 
organizations could pursue a course often advocated by NGOs, namely 
pushing the WTO towards a more open regime through amicus participation.   
 NGO participation tends to focus on non-trade law values such as 
environmental conservation, as evidenced by NGO celebration of the 
Appellate Body’s review of international environmental instruments in 
interpreting GATT Article XX in Shrimp-Turtle.85  Participation of 
prestigious international organizations might increase the weight given by the 
Appellate Body to arguments relying on soft international legal sources such 
as those discussed in Shrimp Turtle.  Further, invoking the values enshrined in 
the WTO preamble, such as sustainable development, might also seem a more 
solid argument if advocated by international organizations in addition to 
NGOs.   
  Would expanding amicus participation to international organizations 
create any additional fairness concerns?  In some cases, LDCs may have a 
legitimate complaint about reliance on institutions such as the IMF.  Professor 
Howse expressed concern over the India case, and the broader deference to 
views of the IMF on development and macroeconomic policy.86  Potentially, 
the Appellate Body might give more weight to an amicus brief filed by the 
IMF than to a brief filed by an environmental NGO.  While troubling 
possibilities do exist, due process considerations would be respected in the 
same manner as with any other amicus participant.  Procedures as discussed 
earlier in this paper, would apply equally to all amicus participants.  Judicial 
caution would of course be exercised in determining the role of amicus 
participation in any given dispute.  Discretion should remain the rule; 
standing itself should not be granted.  Opening the WTO to even more amicus 
participation should serve the function of reducing democracy deficit and 
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increasing transparency.  If properly monitored it should not create any 
dangerous burdens on the WTO dispute settlement process or on parties in 
their individual capacity. 
c. Briefs Relied On 
 Another matter of concern to the future of amicus participation is the 
extent to which amicus briefs are actually considered in dispute settlement.  A 
long history of difficulty surrounds the attempt to convince the Appellate 
Body or panels to consider or rely on amicus briefs.87  As mentioned earlier in 
this paper, in the Asbestos case the Appellate Body rejected all applications 
for leave to file an amicus brief, on the grounds of failure to follow a set of 
simple procedures laid out in an Appellate Body Communication.  This 
inexplicable decision was sent out by form letter, without any further 
explanation. 88 
Fortunately not all amicus briefs have been met with such a dismissive 
response.  In a compliance proceeding, one panel appeared to have relied to 
some extent on an amicus brief.89  More recently, the Appellate Body decided 
to consider some of the arguments of Morocco in Sardines.  These 
developments, especially Sardines, reflect a change in attitude among the 
Appellate Body and/or panelists toward the usefulness of amicus briefs.  The 
emergence of a new category of briefs “relied upon” by the Appellate Body 
would diminish the criticism of amicus practice as an insignificant issue.90 
Acceptance of briefs from governments, government agencies and 
international organizations should facilitate a stronger and more meaningful 
role for amicus participants. 
CONCLUSION 
 The struggle for meaningful access to WTO dispute resolution for 
non-members will continue.  Great strides have been made.  The Appellate 
Body has established that both panels and the Appellate Body have the legal 
authority to accept and consider amicus submissions.91  Permissible amicus 
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participants have expanded to include not only NGOs and individuals but also 
WTO members.92  Other possibilities for government agencies and 
international organizations need to be explored.   
 This article suggests procedures whereby amicus participation might 
be regulated (notably by a group originally opposed to amicus practice).93  
Nevertheless, numerous hurdles to meaningful participation remain.  Many 
WTO members will undoubtedly continue to complain about the Appellate 
Body’s expanding acceptance of amicus briefs.  Complaints about unfairness 
to LDCs, due process, confidentiality, and other issues will continue to 
permeate the debate.  Some would claim that the integrity of the process is at 
stake.  They are correct; and that integrity is best served by expanding, not 
reducing, amicus participation in WTO dispute settlement.   
 This expansion will insure that the public attains some basic 
measure of access to an institution that greatly affects the world economy, and 
therefore individuals everywhere.  The principles of democratic participation 
and transparency will best be served by developing a set of procedural rules to 
insure that due process is respected and the rights of WTO members are not 
threatened.  Once achieved such a procedural mechanism should eliminate a 
great majority of the fairness concerns raised by critics of amicus 
participation.  Therefore it seems prudent for WTO Members to meet and 
negotiate these procedures, using the European Communities’ model as a 
starting point.  The Appellate Body may then continue to develop its amicus 
jurisprudence in a liberal fashion, with a set of procedural rules firmly in 
place. 
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